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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Taxing Political Contributions: The IRS
Balks at Reform
Tax treatment of political contributions, a subject which has received scant
treatment in both tax law and literature, became a controversial topic as a
result of unique forms of campaign fund solicitation by presidential cam-
paign committees in the 1972 elections. Following exposure in the media
of a proliferation of hundreds of "dummy" committees whose only purpose
was to facilitate gift tax avoidance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), siding
with the position taken by the Republican and Democratic National Commit-
tees, issued Revenue Ruling 72-355.1 In contrast to the IRS' historic dis-
pleasure with similar tax avoidance mechanisms, the ruling sanctioned con-
tinued use of the transparent multiple committee device. A second tax
avoidance scheme-solicitation of contributions of appreciated securities to
avoid capital gains taxes-was stymied by the IRS, albeit belatedly, in an
August, 1973 policy statement resolving to tax political committees on gains
realized by their subsequent sales of securities. 2
The Service's rulings revealed not only a divergence from the historic
principles governing gift and income tax law, but a curious inclination to
exert only the mildest tax levy on political committees. In addition to fos-
tering taxpayer cynicism which usually attends enactment of tax provisions
catering to favored groups or enterprises, the IRS' stance threatened to blunt
the long-awaited reforms in federal election financing embodied in the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act 3 and the Revenue Act of 1971.4
1. 1972 INT. RE.V. BULL. No. 29, at 4-6. Also released as T.I.R. 1179 (June 21,
1972). A Revenue Ruling is defined as "an official interpretation by the Service that
has been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Revenue Rulings are issued only
by the National Office and are published for the information and guidance of taxpay-
ers, IRS officials, and others concerned." Rev. Proc. 69-1, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 381,
§ 2.05.
2. 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 33, at 18-19.
3. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1973).
4. PUB. L. No. 92-178 (Jan. 19, 1972).
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I. Gift Tax Treatment of Political Contributions
In recent years contributors to political campaigns who desired to make con-
tributions in excess of $3,000 to one candidacy made their gifts in blocks of
$3,000 or less in order to avoid payment of gift taxes. Although the present
federal gift tax was originally designed 5 to prevent the avoidance of estate
and inheritance taxes by means of transferring one's wealth before death,0
political donors were utilizing the gift tax structure to make their political
contributions tax-free.
Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code7 permits a donor to ex-
clude from the tax the first $3,000 in gifts to each "person" to whom he
makes gifts during a calendar year, the exclusion to recur annually. In ad-
dition, a $30,000 lifetime exemption is allowed against the gift tax which
the taxpayer may take whenever he chooses. 8 Married taxpayers have been
afforded the privilege of splitting their gifts which effectively doubles the
exemptions and exclusions they may take.9
The congressional committee reports which accompanied the 1932 enact-
ment of the current gift tax law reveal that the original reason for the annual
exclusion was "to obviate the necessity of keeping an account of and report-
ing numerous small gifts . . . and to fix the amount sufficiently large to
cover in most cases wedding and Christmas gifts . . . of relatively small
amounts."' 0  Congress' intention to reach practically all transfers by way
of gift is indicated in the Regulations."
Tax experts believe that the present structure of the gift tax enables artful
5. 48 U.S.C. § 495 (1970).
6. "From the very beginning of the Estate Tax in 1916, fertile minds began explor-
ing methods of avoiding its effects. One of the most effective means is not to possess
property at death. Persons possessed of large fortunes thereupon began to make life-
time gifts of substantial portions of their property, as a result of which the Estate
Tax impact was considerably lessened." H. HARRms, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
611-12 (2d ed. 1972). For other historical accounts of the gift tax, see C. LOwNDES
& R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES § 22.1 at 563 (2d ed. 1962) and
Harris, Legislative History of Federal Gift Taxation, 18 TAXES 531 (1940).
7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2521-24.
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2513.
10. S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932) and H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932), both reprinted in 1939-1 CuM. BULL. (Pt. 2) 496, 525-
26.
11. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 provides:
(a) The gift tax applies to a transfer by way of gift whether the transfer is
in trust or otherwise, whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether
the property is real or personal, tangible or intangible ...
(c) The gift tax also applies to gifts indirectly made. Thus, all transactions
whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed
or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or service employed,
constitute gifts subject to tax. ...
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dodgers to utilize the $3,000 annual exclusion and the $30,000 lifetime ex-
emption to give away substantial portions of their properties without incur-
ring either estate or gift tax. 12 But the prospect of hundreds of campaign
committees springing up during election years merely to facilitate gift tax
avoidance was not recognized until the 1968 presidential election,' 8 and was
not challenged until the 1972 campaigns. One account revealed that Richard
M. Scaife, an heir to the Mellon fortune, acknowledged giving the Committee
for the Re-Election of the President $990,000 through 330 separate commit-
tees, thereby escaping payment of between $224,000 and $590,000 in fed-
eral gift taxes.' 4 McGovern financiers admitted organizing as many as 350
separate "gift tax committees" which served no other purpose than to collect
contributions in $3,000 blocks and summarily turn the money over to the
major finance committees for disbursement.' 5 And W. Clement Stone re-
portedly saved as much as one-half million dollars in gift taxes by preparing
700 checks of $3,000 each in order to contribute $2 millon to the Nixon
Re-Election Committee, tax-free.' 6
The applicability of the federal gift tax to political contributions is a
largely uncharted area of the tax law. The Internal Revenue Service has,
however, taken several formal positions on the subject which are informa-
tive in analyzing the June, 1972 gift tax ruling. A 1959 Revenue Ruling
held that political contributions used for campaign and related purposes
constitute taxable gifts.1 7 Not until 1971 did the Service take another formal
position on the gift tax when it responded to a fifth circuit decision in Stern
v. United States.'8
Stern examined transactions made by Edith Stem, a member of a cam-
12. See, e.g., C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES § 21.2
at 564 (2d ed. 1962).
13. See Lehrfeld, The Gift Tax Implications of Political Contributions, 54 A.B.A.J.
1032 (1968) where the author argues that since the proliferation of political commit-
tees during election years had thus far been unchallenged, multiple gifts should be
entitled to multiple exclusions.
14. See Mintz, Politics, Gift and Taxes, The Washington Post, Dec. 25, 1972, at
1, col. 1.
15. Landauer, How Political Donors Avoid Gift, Gains Taxes by Contributing Stock,
The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 27, 1972, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Landauer].
16. Rogovin, Revenuers vs. Republicans, 169 THE NEW REPUBLIC, (July 7 & 14,
1973), at 16, 18. Stock contributions to the Committee to Re-Elect the President from
April 7, 1972 to December 31, 1972 totalled $4,876,731.99.
17. Rev. Rul. 59-57, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 626 provides:
Any individual who makes a contribution or gift in excess of $3,000 in any
one calendar year to a political party or to a candidate for public office must
file a Federal Gift Tax Return, Form 709. To the extent that such a con-
tribution or gift is in excess of $3,000 it may be applied against any or all
unused portion of the $30,000 lifetime specific exemption authorized by section
2521 of the Code.
18. 436 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 23: 322
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paign committee which made expenditures on behalf of a slate of candidates
in a New Orleans election. Ms. Stern and other committee members re-
tained strict control over all expenditures which went to the purchase of
handbills, posters, sample ballots and advertisements. When the taxpayer
filed her federal gift tax return, she contended that the $60,850 she had
contributed to the New Orleans campaign committee "were not gifts, but ex-
penditures which I made to protect my property and personal interests by
promoting efficiency in Government. . ".."19 When federal gift taxes and
interest totalling $35,908.41 were nevertheless assessed against the taxpayer,
she paid them, and, after unsuccessfully seeking a refund, she brought suit in
district court which entered judgment in her favor.
The fifth circuit's affirmance of the lower court finding that the contribu-
tions were not taxable gifts rested principally upon a Treasury Regulation
which provides, in part:
However, a sale, exchange or other transfer of property made in
the ordinary course of business (a transaction which is bona fide,
at arm's length, and free from any donative intent), will be con-
sidered as made for an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth .... 20
The court held that the taxpayer's expenditures were so permeated with
economic motivation that they were to be considered as made for adequate
and full consideration as defined by the Regulation. It did not decide, how-
ever, into what category the contributions fell.
Reaction to the Stern decision was generally unfavorable. One commenta-
tor suggested that it was "unsupportable" in the case law, and, in any event,
was a matter for Congress to decide, not the courts. 21 Others accurately
forcasted the intense efforts on the part of campaign financiers to create
numerous committees to divert smaller, non-taxable gifts into large central
funds.22
Within days of the Stern decision, the IRS announced that it would not
honor the decision except in the fifth circuit and in cases factually identical
to it.23 Because the IRS normally appeals an unfavorable decision to the
Supreme Court or waits for a conflicting circuit court decision before ap-
pealing, the IRS' reaction to Stern could arguably be interpreted as an ef-
fort to avoid the possibility of a ruling which might apply that holding na-
tionwide. Although the peculiarly intense and personal economic motiva-
19. 304 F. Supp. 376, 377-78 (E.D. La. 1969).
20. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8.
21. Note, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rv. 1268 (1971).
22. Note, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 381 (1971) and Note, 46 TUL. L. REV. 344 (1971).
23. T.I.R. 1125 (Dec. 17, 1971).
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tions of the taxpayer in Stern would seem to be an exception rather than the
rule in political giving, the IRS would, at least in cases factually consonant
with Stern, have to treat campaign contributions as taxable income to politi-
cal committees and parties if the Supreme Court upheld that holding.
In June, 1972, in response to requests regarding the criteria by which
political organizations would be recognized as separate donees for purposes
of Section 2503(b), the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 72-355.24 The ruling
set forth the following:
In general, political organizations will be recognized as separate
donees for purposes of the annual gift tax exclusion. Where,
however, political organizations have essentially the same officers
and supported candidates and no substantial independent pur-
pose, the organizations will be treated as one, and gifts to them
by an individual will be aggregated for purposes of section 2503
(b) of the Code. For purposes of this paragraph, the officers or
supported candidates will not be deemed to be essentially the same
if at least one-third of the officers or candidates are different in
each of the committees.25
Illustrative examples which accompanied the Ruling suggest that so long as
political entities manifest a surface dissimilarity in name, officers or sup-
ported candidates, the IRS would not look through the form to reach the
substance of gift transactions.
Since the Ruling was handed down four months before election day, liti-
gation and congressional reaction came swiftly. The IRS composed a public
record of the various letters and memoranda received (hereafter IRS Rec-
ord).26  Suspicious of heavy-handed White House intervention in the Ruling,
24. 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 29, at 4-6. Also released as T.I.R. 1179 (June 21,
1972).
25. Id. at 5(emphasis supplied).
26. The IRS received twenty-seven memoranda and letters from Congressmen, public
interest and tax groups and the Republican and Democratic National Committees sub-
mitted to the IRS prior to its March, 1973 hearing on contributions of appreciated prop-
erty. Complaint Requesting an Injunction against Unlawful Withholding of Records at 1
Nader v. I.R.S., Civil No. 1851-72 (D.D.C., filed May 18, 1973). The request was made
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act and Treas. Reg. § 601.702(c). The IRS
denied the request, and Public Citizen appealed to the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue who affirmed the denial. On Sept. 14, 1972, Public Citizen sought a permanent
injunction enjoining the IRS from further withholding the information requested. On
May 8, 1973, defendants made available to plaintiffs certain inter-agency and intra-
agency records of the IRS and the Treasury Department. Prompted by evidence of
alleged White House interference with the original IRS decision that contributions to
multiple committees be allowed only one $3,000 exclusion, Public Citizen, on May
18, 1973 requested that the court issue a declaratory judgment that (1) Revenue Rul-
ing 72-355 was unlawful, unconstitutional and unlawfully adopted and issued; and (2)
that defendants be enjoined from continuing to apply the Ruling. In a deposition
of Peter Weidenbruch, IRS Assistant Commissioner (Technical), Weidenbruch suggested
that the Ruling was not issued through normal channels. Usually, the Technical Division
[Vol. 23:322
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Ralph Nader's Public Citizen brought suit against the IRS, its Commissioner
and the Secretary of the Treasury requesting the defendants to produce all
communications between the White House and other agencies in the Execu-
tive Branch as well as all requests for advice and internal memoranda sub-
mitted to and written by IRS personnel. 27 Tax Analysts and Advocates,
joined by the National Committee for an Effective Congress, sought a de-
claratory judgment that the Ruling was unlawful, and a permanent injunc-
tion requiring the Service to withdraw it.28
Congressional reaction was equally vigorous. In March, 1973, Senators
Hugh Scott (R.-Pa.) and Charles McC. Mathias (R.-Md.) introduced a bill
that would eliminate political contributions from the definition of "gifts" for
purposes of the gift tax.2 9  Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (D.-Ill.) intro-
duced legislation which would eliminate abuse of the multiple-committee
device by providing that "gifts to a committee which supports a candidate
will be deemed to have been made directly to the candidate unless the con-
tributor establishes that he could not reasonably have been expected to know
which candidate would benefit from his gift."30
On the other hand, tax lawyers and accountants, though pausing to con-
sider the questionable vitality of the gift tax laws as applied to political
contributions, began to publish mathematical formulae to determine pre-
cisely how many persons and committees would be necessary to safely avoid
liability for gift taxes.31
The Ruling was attacked on other substantive grounds. In comments
submitted prior to the March, 1973 IRS hearing on a related matter,3 2 many
prepares a draft which is reviewed by the General Counsel's Office and main Treasury.
In this instance, the Ruling originated in the Office of General Counsel which discussed
it with main Treasury, then referred it to Technical for review.
27. See letter from William Dobrovir, counsel for Public Citizen to IRS, Jan. 2,
1973, to which an excerpt of the Weidenbruch deposition is attached. IRS RECORD,
supra note 26. See also Press Release from Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D. Wisc.)
(June 9, 1973) at 3, where the congressman challenges "the apparent combination
in restraint of tax collection."
28. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 1, Tax Ana-
lysts & Advocates v. Shultz, Civil No. 594-73 (D.D.C. filed March 28, 1973).
29. S. 1097, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 3860 (daily
ed. March 6, 1973). The bill has been referred to the Committee on Finance.
30. S. 2065, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and discussed in 119 CONG. REc. 11849,
11850 (daily ed. June 25, 1973). The bill has been referred to the Committee on
Finance.
31. "Whether the one-third rule has the effect of making the gift tax a nullity as
applied to political contributions remains to be seen. However, careful advance plan-
ning, including the creation of a sufficient number of committees, use of enough offi-
cers in various combinations, and support of multiple candidates, should make it possi-
ble for a donor to give substantial funds for political campaigns without imposition
of gift taxes." Fernschreiber & Granwell, Avoiding Gift Tax on Political Contribu-
tion: Obstacles and Opportunities, 50 TAXEs 671 (1972).
32. See Part II, infra.
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charged that the Ruling was totally inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
holding in Helvering v. Hutchings."8 Not many years after the gift tax
was enacted, Hutchings resolved a problem which arose with respect to gifts
in trust, namely the determination of whether the trustee or the ultimate
beneficiary of the trust was to be considered the donee. The Court held
that a gift in trust was a gift to the beneficiaries of the trust for purposes
of the gift tax exclusion. The language from the opinion seems to indicate
that, as is the case with gifts in trust, the donor to a political committee be-
stows the benefit of his donation upon the candidate or candidates whose
campaign it would help finance:
. . . for present purposes it is of more importance that in common
understanding and in the common use of language a gift is made
to him upon whom the donor bestows the benefit of his donation.
One does not speak of making a gift to a trust rather than to his
children who are its beneficiaries ...
Moreover, the very purpose of allowing a gift tax exemption meas-
ured by the number of donees, would be defeated if a distinction
were to be taken between gifts made directly to numerous donees
and a gift made for their benefit by way of a single trust, and we
are unable to discern in the statute or its legislative history any
purpose to make such a distinction. . . . Further, such an as-
sumption would open the way to avoid the $5,000 limitation upon
the allowed exemption, by resort to the simple expedient of the
creation by a single donor of any number of trusts of $5,000
each for the benefit of a single beneficiary.84
The Ruling was criticized as an unjustified and all-too-friendly invitation
for political committees to deliberately avoid tax payments.85
Apart from the IRS' apparent divergence from the Hutchings rule, it
seemed difficult to justify the Ruling in light of the position taken by the
IRS in Estelle Morris Trusts v. Commissioner.8 There, two individuals
33. 312 U.S. 393 (1941). This view was argued in letters contained in IRS RECORD
from Tax Analysts and Advocates to IRS at 11-12 (Dec. 15, 1972); Letter from Public
Citizen, Inc. to IRS at 4, Nov. 20, 1972; Memorandum from Professor Charles Daven-
port and Meade Emory of the University of California School of Law at Davis to IRS
at 4, Dec. 15, 1972, sponsored by Taxation With Representation; and Letter from Na-
tional Committee For an Effective Congress to IRS at 1, Dec. 6, 1972. The IRS dis-
tinguished Hutchings in the revenue ruling on the basis that political organizations must
be distinguished from private trusts, but gave no reason to support the distinction.
34. 312 U.S. at 396-97 (emphasis supplied).
35. "The Service's view is extremely permissive. Even though several committees
are formed for the sole purpose of supporting one candidate and have no 'substantial
independent purpose', they will be treated as separate entities for purposes of the an-
nual exclusion so long as their officers were different." Faber, Gift Tax Planning, 2
N.Y.U. THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, 1217, 1260-61 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Faber].
36. 51 T.C. 20 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 23:322
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executed ten trust instruments each, established for the same beneficiary,
and whose sole purpose was gift tax avoidance. In summarizing the Service's
position which supported consolidation of the trust instruments, the court
said: ". . . respondent [IRS] characterizes these trusts as shams lacking
business purpose which, apart from the anticipated tax benefit, are without
substance. 3 7
I1. Income Tax Treatment of Political Contributions
One would be hard pressed to find statutory or constitutional support for
the IRS' failure to tax ordinary income of political parties and committees.
However, the Service, under both Republican and Democratic administra-
tions, has perpetuated a "hands off" policy when it comes to requiring par-
ties to file tax returns or to collecting taxes on income realized by them.
Under the Code, a political party's income would seem to be taxable.
Section 6011 of the Code38 requires "any person" liable for any federal
taxes to file a return; section 7701(a)(1) defines a "person" to include "an
individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corpora-
tion."39  In addition, Subchapter F of the Code does not exclude political
entities from liability for income tax. A Treasury Regulation also precludes
from treatment as tax exempt organizations, those organizations which are
engaged in "direct or indirect participation or intervention in political cam-
paigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office." '40
Unless Congress has specifically granted an exemption for political parties,
they appear to be within the reach of the Code. 41
A discernible pattern emerges when one examines the federal govern-
ment's record of selective enforcement of the tax laws with respect to politi-
cal parties. In 1965, the IRS took what seemed to be an unequivocal posi-
37. 51 T.C. at 39. The court held that it would not consolidate the trusts even
though they were established with the express purpose of obtaining tax benefits
through multiple entries.
38. INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 6011.
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(1).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (1959).
41. "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 taxes income from whatever source de-
rived, and exempts only certain enumerated types of organizations, specifically defined
and limited. Political parties are not exempted. Notwithstanding the function of par-
ties in the scheme of American politics, assuming that patterns of taxation are applied
evenly without regard to partisanship, parties have no obvious characteristics that nec-
essarily place at least their ordinary and commercial investment income beyond the
reach of the nondiscriminatory tax gatherer. This conclusion is based upon an ele-
mentary distinction between the nature and source of income, as differentiated from
its use or application, no matter what its original nature. The purposes for which
resources are spent, be they income or capital, do not render income exempt from
taxation unless Congress has particularly said so." Boehm, Political Expenditures, 231
TAx MANAGEMENT A-41 (1970).
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tion in an internal memorandum in Democratic League of San Francisco when
it said that "unless a political party has received some sort of tax dispensa-
tion, the operative presumption must be that its income is subject to taxa-
tion.4 2
Again, when exerting pressure against the American Communist Party,
the Department of Justice, in Communist Party v. Commissioner,48 said in
its brief: "Political parties are simply not exempt from income tax by stat-
ute, regulation or ruling-public or private, published or unpublished. '44
The court specifically said in its opinion, "[T]he Government now assures
us that all political parties, including petitioner, are taxable associations un-
der the statute. . .. -"4 And in 1968, the Service published Revenue Pro-
cedure 68-19 which provided that political committees were to file U.S.
Fiduciary Income Tax Returns to report the unexpended balance of any
political funds set aside in separate bank accounts-and pay any taxes
shown to be payable. 46
Aside from this explicit evidence to support the susceptibility of political
entities to income taxation-at least insofar as splinter groups or parties not
in the mainstream of American politics are concerned-the Service clarified
its equivocal use of the word "may" in Revenue Procedure 68-19 when it
admitted to members of Congress that there is no justification for not taxing
income to political parties and committees across the board:
In a letter to Congressman Frank E. Evans (D.-Colo.) dated
May 8, 1972, 47 the Service cited Revenue Procedure 68-19 in sup-
port of its direction that an Evans' political committee pay any in-
come tax for which it was liable from interest earned on excess
funds deposited in a financial institution.
In a letter to Senator Gaylord Nelson (D.-Wisc.) dated March 22,
1973,48 the IRS said that although revenue procedures do not
carry the same force and effect of revenue rulings, the word "may"
used in Revenue Procedure 68-19 is to be interpreted as meaning
"shall" since the "Service has ruled consistent with Sec. 4.02 of
42. G.C.M. 32991, A-618266 (March 19, 1965) as excerpted in Press Release from
Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D. Wisc.), June 9, 1973 at 3.
43. 373 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1967).
44. Brief for Government at 8, Communist Party v. Commissioner, 373 F.2d 682
(6th Cir. 1967).
45. 373 F.2d at 684.
46. Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 811 provides:
If an unexpended balance of political funds is set aside in a separate bank
account, the political candidate, committee or organization holding such funds
may report any income credited to the account on a U.S. Fiduciary Income
Tax Return, Form 1041, for the taxable year in which such income is so
credited, and pay any tax shown by such return to be payable. (Section 4.02)
47. Letter from IRS to Congressman Frank E. Evans (D.-Colo.), May 8, 1972.
48. Letter from IRS to Senator Gaylord Nelson (D.-Wisc.), March 22, 1973.
[Vol. 23: 322
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the Revenue Procedure that political candidates, committees or
organizations holding political funds on behalf of political can-
didates should report the income earned through the investment
of such funds." This rule applies, said the IRS, no matter what
election year such funds were solicited for.
Contributions of Appreciated Property: Shouldn't Somebody Be Taxed?
In an article published in The Wall Street Journal49 it was revealed that, for
the first time in any significant degree, the major political parties were so-
liciting contributions of appreciated securities to help finance the 1972 presi-
dential elections. Republican financiers, relying on the standard tax princi-
ples applicable to transfers of appreciated property, sent out form letters
to prospective donors which, in addition to indicating that payment of the
capital gains tax could be avoided, also suggested that such contributions
could be fashioned to avoid imposition of the gift taxY° According to the
Journal, neither the donors nor the donees were reporting gains realized on
subsequent sales or conversions of appreciated assets.
The practice of making contributions of appreciated property instead of
cash is hardly unusual. Often persons make charitable contributions of ap-
preciated securities in order to avoid payment of capital gains taxes, but the
application of the tax in this instance turns in large measure on whether
or not transfers in the form of political contributions are to be treated as
"gifts" for income tax purposes. A different standard is applicable in in-
come tax law than in gift tax law: while the gift tax generally looks to the
presence or absence of consideration, the income tax looks to the donor's
motive and intent.51 In the income tax area, the definition was set out by
the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Duberstein52 where the Court said
a transfer is to be treated as a gift if it is given with "detached and disinter-
ested generosity." 53 Although scholarly political journals and the findings
49. Landaner, supra note 15.
50. The form letter reads in part:
"I am delivering this stock to you as my agent to effect transfer as herein set
forth. You are authorized and directed to divide this stock into certificates
with values not to exceed $3,000 each, on the date of transfer, and to cause
one of the certificates, as my agent for such purpose, to be transferred to
each of the following separate entities.... ".Landauer, supra note 15 at
24, col. 6.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 69 n.6 (1962) where the Court
said: "In interpreting the particular income tax provisions here involved, we find our-
selves unfettered by the language and considerations ingrained in the gift and estate
tax statutes." For an explanation of the relationship between gift and income tax,
see C. LoWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 31.10 at 678,
§ 32.12 at 699 (2d ed. 1962).
52. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
53. Id. at 285.
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
of public opinion polls on the subject are extensive, the only consensus that
can be reached about motivations behind political contributions is that they
are sometimes obscure, often diverse and seldom predictable."4 Two tax
experts, sponsored by Taxation With Representation, submitted a memo-
randum to the IRS which argued that motives behind political contributions
-be they strongly felt political or ideological beliefs, the expectation of eco-
nomic benefit or the expectation of favors in return-do not meet the Du-
burstein test, and therefore relieve recipients from income tax liability.r 'l
Tax Analysts and Advocates theorized that insofar as political contributions
are predicated upon use for expenses of a campaign, they may be likened
to transfers "in trust" for the accomplishment of a specific purpose, and do
not constitute income to the recipient.56
Assuming such contributions are gifts, however, Section 1015 of the Code
provides that, for purposes of computing gain, the donee must assume the
donor's basis, i.e. "tax cost" where a gift is made of appreciated property.5 7
Thus, the appreciation in value in the hands of the donor and the donee is
subjected to tax upon disposition by the donee. 58 In the case of the transfer
of appreciated stock worth $10,000, for example, which the donor pur-
chased for $2,000, an $8,000 taxable gain to the donee is realized when
the committee sells or converts the appreciated stock.
Less than one week after the Journal's story, the IRS, obviously embar-
rassed by what seemed to be a blatant scheme to cheat the government, an-
nounced that it was soliciting briefs and comments in preparation for public
hearings on the subject of tax treatment of appreciated property contrib-
uted to political parties and committees.5 9 In what was a notable oversight
in not mentioning its letters of advice to congressmen and their supporters
or its postions in the cases cited above, the announcement said:
It is a matter of history that the Internal Revenue Service has
never required the filing of income tax returns by political parties
as such. It appears that this practice had its inception and was
continued in the belief that virtually all of the receipts of the parties
were from gifts and that the parties would not have taxable income.
54. See, e.g., A. HEARD, THaE CosTs OF DEMOCRACY (1960) and H. ALEXANDER,
MONEY IN POLITICS (1972).
55. IRS RECoRD, Memorandum from Professors Charles Davenport and Meade Em-
ory of the University of California School of Law at Davis to IRS at 4, Dec. 15,
1972.
56. IRS RECORD, Letter from Tax Analysts and Advocates to Commissioner of in-
ternal Revenue, at 7-8, Dec. 15, 1972.
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1015.
58. In Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929), the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of this taxing device.
59. IRS Press Release, No. 1257 (Oct. 3, 1972).
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This practice made it unnecessary to decide finally whether parties
were subject to tax.60
A formal notice in the Federal Register two weeks later6 l yielded twenty-
seven submissions from counsel for the Democratic and Republican Na-
tional Committees, individual congressmen, public interest and tax groups,
and other interested parties, some of whom also gave oral testimony at
a public hearing held on March 1, 1973.
Two of the more important issues raised in the comments to IRS were
(1) whether the contributor or the political party actually realizes the gain
upon disposition of capital assets and (2) whether any future IRS ruling
with respect to such transfers should be applied retroactively. One of the
theories advanced in several briefs was that gains realized on sales of appre-
ciated assets should be taxable to the donor.62 Support for this position was
based upon the accepted practice of taxing the donor where there is an
implicit or express agreement that the property is to be sold by the donee.
Alternatively, the theory was supported on the basis that the donor's gain,
though often intangible, is realized when his contribution serves to further
ideological beliefs or gain access to the candidate.68
The sensitive political decision the IRS would have to make in deciding
whether to apply the ruling retroactively was also considered in the IRS
record of briefs.6 4  Predictably, the Democratic and Republican National
Committees vigorously exhorted the IRS to apply its rule only prospectively,
while public interest groups said the Service would have no sound basis for
applying the ruling with other than retroactive effect. By allowing gains
realized by donors or political committees to go untaxed, it was argued, an
increased tax burden would be placed on taxpayers who did not support
the candidate and would be permitting legislation of a tax subsidy by the
Treasury Department.65 Public Citizen urged that retroactive application
would be reasonable and equitable in light of the fact that there had been no
60. Id. at 2 (emphasis supplied).
61. 37 C.F.R. § 22427 (1972). See also Mintz, Taxes and Political Structures:
IRS Takes a Look, The Washington Post, Dec. 26, 1972, at C2, col. 1.
62. See IRS RECORD, Memorandum from Professors Charles Davenport and Meade
Emory of the University of California Law School at Davis to IRS at 5-10, Dec. 15,
1972, sponsored by Taxation with Representation; Letter from Tax Analysts and Ad-
vocates to IRS at 6, Dec. 15, 1972; and Letter from Marmet & Webster to IRS at 4,
Jan. 5, 1973.
63. See IRS RECORD, Memorandum from Professors Charles Davenport and Meade
Emory of the University of California Law School at Davis to IRS at 4, Dec. 15,
1972, sponsored by Taxation With Representation.
64. Section 7805(b) of the 1954 Code provides that "The Secretary or his delegate
may prescribe the extent, if any, to which any ruling or regulation relating to the
Internal Revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect."
65. See IRS RECORD, Memorandum from Mark F. Corriea to IRS at 19-20, Dec.
15, 1972.
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definitive statement by IRS upon which taxpayers might have justifiably re-
lied. 66 Finally, on August 1, 1973, the IRS proposed to end decades of
uncertainty by henceforth requiring political parties and committees to file
appropriate tax returns. Gross income to political parties and committee
was now deemed to include interest and dividends from investments, income
from any ancillary commercial activity and gains from the sales by the
committee or party of appreciated property.67 In view of what it called
the "major inequities" which would result if the new policy were to be ap-
plied retroactively, the Service, siding with the position taken by both major
political parties, decided it would be enforced only against sales subsequent
to its October 3, 1972 statement of its concern with the problem. 6s
Although the Service made a major breakthrough in finally requiring par-
ties and committees to file income tax returns, the "prospective-only" appli-
cation focused, as did the gift tax ruling, on the IRS' inclination to exert
only its mildest tax levy on political parties. One wonders how often the
IRS points to "major inequities" and the possibility of placing entities in
bankruptcy when levying against the ordinary taxpayer who cannot meet
his tax obligations. And to those who found it inequitable that the IRS
retained tax monies it had accepted from political organizations who chose
to be cautious and pay the tax, the discomforting prospect that the Service
was rewarding the clever "tax dodger" while maintaining a hard line against
the responsible taxpayer, was very apparent.69
III. The IRS and Congressional Reform of Election Financing
Congressional enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act70 and
66. See IRS RECORD, Letter from Public Citizen, Inc. to IRS at 10, Nov. 20, 1972.
Retroactive application was also supported in the Memorandum from Professors Charles
Davenport and Meade Emory of the University of California Law School at Davis
to IRS at 17, Dec. 15, 1972, sponsored by Taxation With Representation.
67. 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 33 at 18-19 provides, in part: "Gains on the sale
of appreciated property, net of any losses, shall be included in income of political
parties or committees to the extent provided in the Internal Revenue Code." The Ser-
vice also reaffirmed its adherence to Revenue Ruling 72-355 for the determination of
gift tax liability.
68. Three revenue rulings issued by the IRS on December 20, 1973 clarify Federal
income tax treatment of political parties, unexpended campaign contributions transferred
to the U.S. government by political committees, and the receipt and disbursement of
funds by political candidates. See IRS Press Release No. 1344 (Dec. 20, 1973). The
text of the rulings--Revenue Rulings 74-21, 74-22 and 74-23-are published in 1974
INT. REV. BULL. No. 2.
69. See Letter from Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (D.-Ill.) to IRS Commissioner,
Aug. 3, 1973, in IRS RECORD where the Senator says: "Your policy statement does
not address the question whether taxpayers such as the [Citizens for Stevenson] Fund
are entitled to a refund. On the face of it, there appears to be a serious inequity
in retaining the pre-October taxes paid by political committees which did comply with
the law, while allowing political committees which did not pay the tax to escape liabil-
ty. 
21
70. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. 1973).
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the Revenue Act of 197171 had already made the IRS a focal point for
efforts to reform campaign financing. Replacing the loosely-drawn and
rarely enforced 1925 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, the Federal Election
Campaign Act provides for comprehensive disclosure of significant receipts
and expenditures among its major provisions. Simultaneously, the Revenue
Act of 1971 allows contributors to take a tax credit against federal income
tax for 50 percent of their contributions up to a maximum of $12.50 on a
single return and $25 on a joint return.7 2  Alternatively, the taxpayer may
take a deduction for the full amount of contributions up to a maximum of $50
on a single return and $100 on a joint return.73 Taken together, the acts were
designed to encourage wider participation in campaign financing by pledg-
ing that the government would share the cost.
74
The IRS rulings on gift and income tax treatment for political contribu-
tions will have a number of adverse side effects on the administration of the
acts and on the broad policy goals Congress hoped to implement. First, the
three supervisory officers charged with responsibility for compiling and mak-
ing available campaign financial reports-the Secretary of the Senate, the
Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Comptroller General of the
United States-are now burdened with additional administrative duties as a
result of IRS' acquiescence to multiple gift tax exclusions. Insofar as Reve-
nue Ruling 72-355 invites proliferation of gift tax committees having no
substantial independent purpose, the huge amount of paper work to be
handled by the supervisory officers may cause further delays in getting
campaign finance data to the press and public well in advance of primaries
and general elections.
75
71. PuB. L. No. 92-178 (Jan. 19, 1972).
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 41, 642(a)(3).
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 218, amending § 642(i). The Act also created
a Presidential Election Campaign Fund through which taxpayers may finance presi-
dential campaigns of their choice by "checking off" $1 or $2 (in the case of a joint
return) to be used for the first time in the 1976 presidential election. INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 802, amending § 6096(a).
74. "The theory was that the tax credits and deductions, if accompanied by an
educational campaign to acquaint the American people of their availability, and if the
candidates and committees stepped up their solicitation campaigns accordingly, could
bring in more small funds for several reasons. Tax incentives signifying government
encouragement of the act of giving are in effect a 'sales tool' enabling solicitors to
ask small contributors-say, those giving up to $25 in the past-to double the amount
of their gifts since the government is now sharing in the cost. In short, the combi-
nation of disclosure of large contributions and of tax incentives could, if properly ex-
ploited, serve to broaden the financial base of politics." Paper presented by Dr. Her-
bert E. Alexander, Director of the Citizens Research Foundation, to the International
Political Science Association Congress in Montreal at 5, Aug. 22, 1973. See also
B. Jordan, Report of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration on S. 382,
S. REP. No. 229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1972).
75. See IRS REcoRD, Letter from Phillip S. Hughes, Director of the Office of Federal
Elections in GAO, to the IRS Commissioner at 2, Nov. 17, 1972.
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Numerous administrative difficulties also arise with respect to reporting
contributions of appreciated property which are split into $3,000 gifts to
avoid payment of gift taxes. The Director of the Office of Federal Elections
in the General Accounting Office (GAO) posed this example of an indi-
vidual's contribution of $100,000 worth of stock which is divided among
30 separate committees:
The substance of the transaction is that the main committee re-
ceives $100,000 and expends $10,000, for a net contribution of
$90,000. Should that committee report a contribution received of
$100,000 or $90,000 or $3,000. If the committee reports either
$100,000 or $90,000, the actual transaction is more accurately re-
flected, but the donor would be subject to gift tax liability. If the
committee and its 29 affiliates each report $3,000, it means that
a person must look at 30 reports to discover the total contribution.
Furthermore, the reports may show different dates and probably
will not reflect any connection with the overall transaction. .... 7"
Perhaps more important than the administrative handicaps resulting from
the IRS' rulings is the decidedly dampening effect they will have on Con-
gress' attempt to broaden the base of political financing. While, on the one
hand, Congress is telling taxpayers that their government will share in the
cost of small contributions, the Service seems to be telling large contributors
that it will continue to allow creative gimmickry in fashioning political con-
tributions and committees to avoid gift tax liability. Students of tax policy
who have noted the effect that special tax provisions favoring certain groups
or activities have on taxpayer morale report that dangerous attitudes may
develop. 77 In a tax system so largely dependent upon voluntariness, the
possibility that the IRS' position towards large contributors might engender
hostility among taxpayers generally and among the class of taxpayers at-
tracted to the idea of tax credits and deductions on political contributions
in particular, is apparent. 78
Congressional Options
There are many possibilities which Congress may examine in shaping legis-
lative alternatives to tax treatment of political contributions. 79  Even a
76. Id. at 3.
77. Blum, The Effects of Special Provisions in the Income Tax Law on Taxpayer
Morale, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Federal Tax Policy for Economic
Growth and Stability, 251-260 (1955) appearing in F. SANDER & D. WESTFALL, READ-
IN OS IN FEDERAL TAxATION 41-49 (1970).
78. An Illinois attorney wrote to the IRS Commissioner, "I sincerely believe that
there has been a lot of alienation among the not so affluent classes in the country
concerning the past treatment of these privileged political committees." IRS RECORD,
Letter from Kevin M. Teeven to IRS Chief Counsel Lee H. Henkel, Jr., Dec. 14, 1972.
79. The House Ways and Means Committee has listed tax status of political organ-
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cursory glance at the range of suggestons included in the record of IRS'
hearings in March, 1973, reveals the practical flexibility of tax law in dealing
with the policy questions incident to political campaign financing.
In the gift tax area, several organizations have suggested that Congress
should exempt political contributions from liability for gift taxes for any
number of reasons. Counsel for the Republican National Committee argues
that it is contrary to sound public policy to impose a tax on the political
process by penalizing the operation of "bona fide separate committees."80
Tax Analysts and Advocates thinks that "gift tax committees" created only
for tax avoidance purposes should be characterized as nominees or agents
of the operating finance committees to which they transfer contributions;
"operating" political finance committees, however, which are organized to fi-
nance the campaign of a single candidate, should be characterized as trusts
for federal income tax purposes.8 ' Another tack was taken in an article
which persuasively reasons that exempting political contributions from the gift
tax would in no way defeat the policies which inform gift tax law:
The policy reasons for having a gift tax would not be under-
mined by an exclusion for political contributions any more than
they are by the present deduction for charitable gifts. Aside from
revenue raising considerations, the legislative history indicates that
the gift tax was primarily designed to prevent avoidance of the
estate tax by lifetime gifts and of the income tax by splitting in-
come. Political contributions are not motivated by the desire to
avoid estate taxes by passing property during the donor's lifetime
to the ones who will eventually inherit it, nor is income splitting a
consideration.8 2
Congress also has the option of deciding whether or not to permit con-
tributions of appreciated property, and, if they are permitted, to decide if
and how subsequent gains on sales by the committee or party will be taxed.
Certainly an imposition of capital gains tax on the donor would discourage
these contributions, and such a move would be justified by a strong equitable
argument. When a small contributor gives $5 or $25 to a political party,
it is "after tax income," i.e. what the taxpayer can afford after his taxes are
paid. When the stock contributor gives, however, it is in anticipation of his
income tax liability-a manipulaton of assets to assure he will pay less
taxes at the end of the year. Unless the IRS is contending that stock con-
izations as a major topic to be covered in tax reform hearings scheduled for the second
session of the 93rd Congress.
80. IRS REcoRD, Letter from Henry R. McPhee to the IRS at 18, Jan. 5, 1973,
on behalf of the Republican National Finance Committee.
81. IRS RECORD, Letter from Tax Analysts and Advocates to IRS at 7, Dec. 15,
1972.
82. Faber, supra note 35 at 1263-64.
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tributors should be able to give the same dollars cheaper than the small
contributor, some modification of the present rule is necessary to rectify the
manifest inequity now permitted. 83 No matter who is taxed when contri-
butions of appreciated property are made, however, the burden on mem-
bers of the press and public in trying to ascertain the full transaction will
not be lessened so long as multiple gift tax exclusions are still permitted.
Only by prohibiting contributions of appreciated property altogether will
these confusing and unnecessary reporting complexities be eliminated.
Conclusion
The role which Congress may choose to play in revoking or modifying the
IRS decisions will surely tell taxpayers how serious it is about lessening
the role of "big money" in financing the American electoral process. Studies
of the interplay between Congress and the IRS when dealing with special
interest tax provisions reveal an inclination on the part of Congress either to
defer by not acting at all,8 4 or to affirmatively favor such provisions, par-
ticularly where there is no organized lobbying group to protest and no in-
terested public to whom the congressman is held accountable. When a spe-
cial tax provision has to do with labor, oil, gas or farm legislation, cham-
pions of the special interests give Congress sharply defined interpretations
of the impact of new proposals. So too, here, have the special interests
and more public-spirited groups provided Congress with articulate and di-
vergent viewpoints. Although Congress sometimes rationalizes its acquies-
cence to favored tax provisions by pointing to its lack of time, staff, budget
and expertise in tax matters, no such protestations will suffice to excuse con-
gressional inaction in an area so intimately tied to its pivotal role in election re-
form.85  By clarifying the role tax policy is to have on our political
financing system, Congress can help enhance the attractiveness of small
political giving and counter IRS' inclination to wink at the tax laws when
they hit influential groups.
Roslyn A. Mazer
83. In support of this argument, see Letter from Senator Stevenson, supra note 69
at 3.
84. Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decision-Making-The Debt-Equity Im-
broglio and Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 Hlv. L. REV. 1695
(1970).
85. See generally, Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax
Provisions Get Enacted, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1957).
[Vol. 23: 322
